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Abstract
Donald Capps (2009: 145) suggested the hypothesis that “the Nash equilibrium is descriptive of
the normal brain, whereas the game theory formulated by John van Neumann, which Nash’s
theory challenges, is descriptive of the schizophrenic brain”. The paper offers arguments in its
favor. They are from psychiatry, game theory, set theory, philosophy and theology. The Nash
equilibrium corresponds to wholeness,  stable  emergent  properties  as well  as to representing
actual infinity on a material, limited and finite organ as a human brain.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The  philosophical  relation  of  common  sense  and  schizophrenia  has  a  natural  focus  in  the
personality  and  creativity  of  John  Nash  (1928  –  2015),  Nobel  Prize  in  economics  (1994),
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia (1959). 
One of his fundamental ideas refers to a new interpretation of equilibrium in game theory and
philosophy of mathematics as noncompetitive in noncooperative games or even as a way for any
competition of gamers  or factors to be prevented.  It  is  directly  opposed to that  of John von
Neumann, one of the founders of mathematical game theory and its application in economics. 
A  few  early  papers  of  Nash  (1950;  1950a;  1951)  prove  a  generalization  (Park,  2011)  of
Neumann’s approach (Neumann, Morgenstern, 1953; Israel & Gasca, 2009; Nash et al., 1996).
The quotability of “Nash equilibrium” grows exponentially (Mccain,  & Mccain,  2010).  Nash
obtained the Nobel Prize in economics (Milnor, 1995). 
The  essence  of  Nash’s  equilibrium  consists  in  the  aims  to  be  divided  between  the  players
disjunctively therefore achieving a more stable  equilibrium (Marsili  & Zhang,  1997).  On the
contrary,  they  share  the  aim(s)  in  Neumann’s  approach  being  always  in  direct  competition
conditioning  instability  and  trends  to  disintegration.  The  Nash  equilibrium  can  be  seen  as
“strategic” (Crawford, 2002).
The prevention of rival is the best strategy of gamers who mean the strategies of all the rest for
gain.  If  all  gamers  mean these strategies,  they turn out  to  be in a  stable  state,  that  of  Nash
equilibrium. On the contrary, the gamers in Neumann’s approach neglect the others’ strategies
therefore addressing one and the same purpose. 
Thus, the collective gain of all gamers in Nash’s approach is much bigger, but the individual gain
of the single winner is bigger in Neumann’s approach.  
Furthermore, the Nash gamers should be gifted with the ability to know or forecast the strategies
of all the rest. If the gamers are human beings as in economic models, this is natural and self-
obvious. However, if they are not, the Neumann approach seems to be more relevant. 
Nevertheless,  all  thermodynamic  approaches,  including  quantum  mechanics  considered  as  a
special kind of generalized thermodynamic theory, admit the option of Nash equilibrium though
the agents have not consciousness and might not “know” or “mean” the strategies of the others.
The condition sine qua non in statistic thermodynamics is their duality of agents and a whole, the
system of all agents, which should be in equilibrium as far as the system exists. 
One may conclude that Nash equilibrium is relevant to describe any ensemble if it is presupposed
as  a  system.  On the  contrary,  if  it  is  a  random collection  existing  as  a  whole  occasionally
destroyable or re-configurable at any time, the Neumann approach seems to be the relevant one.
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The paper is organized as follows: Section II considers the link between the Nash equilibrium and
schizophrenia in comparison with Neumann’s approach to equilibrium. Section III discusses the
connection  between  the  concepts  of  information  and  Nash  equilibrium  addressing  the
schizophrenia models. The last section summarizes the research.
II THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 
Donald Capps (2009: 145) suggested the hypothesis that “the Nash equilibrium is descriptive of
the normal  brain,  whereas the game theory formulated by John van Neumann,  which Nash’s
theory challenges, is descriptive of the schizophrenic brain”. The paper offers arguments in its
favor. They are from psychiatry, game theory, set theory, philosophy and theology.
Indeed, the brain,  mind and consciousness are natural to be considered as systems even as a
system. Thus, equilibrium seems to be presupposed necessarily and the Nash equilibrium as well.
One does not need their separated functions or parts to be considered as conscious gamers able to
mean the others’ strategies or cooperating with each other. Only the wholeness of both brain and
mind seems to be enough to be postulated as usual. 
Any violation of that wholeness would be a form of mental disorder, and the Neumann approach
would be more relevant if that is the case. 
Schizophrenia is featured by a series of instabilities and trends to disintegration in: 
– “Common sense” (McEvoy et al.,  1996; Stanghellini,  2000; Blankenburg & Mishara, 2001;
Stanghellini & Ballerini, 2007; Revsbech, Sass & Parnas, 2012)
– Imagination and perception (Sheiner, 1968; Frith, 1987; Simons et al., 2006; Brébion et al.,
2008; Gawęda, Moritz & Kokoszka, 2012; Giacobbe, Stukas & Farhall, 2013)
– The self (Hemsley, 1998; Stanghellini & Ballerini 2007).
– The perception of the others (Sheiner, 1968; Stanghellini & Ballerini, 2007; Benedetti, 2009;
Giacobbe, Stukas & Farhall, 2013)
– Time perception (Lyon, Lyon & Magnusson, 1994;  Bonnot et al., 2011; Parsons et al., 2013;
Peterburs, 2013; Gómez, 2014)
– Choice and rationality (Cromwell et al., 1961; Frith, 1987; Haggard et al., 2004; Revsbech,
Sass & Parnas, 2012)
– Understanding metaphors (Kircher et al., 2007; Mo, 2008; Elvevag, 2011)
The enumeration can be continued, but all those cases can be described as the severe competition
of  mental  functions  with a  single  winner  and the  suppression  of  the defeating  functions  too
important for integrity and psychic health.  
The Japanese psychiatrists even renamed schizophrenia (Sato, 2006; Sartorius et al., 2014) to
“Togo Shitcho Sho” (“Integration dysregulation disorder”). 
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III INFORMATION MODELS OF SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Choice,  mental  time,  and  information  processing  (Usher  & McClelland,  2001;  Wittmann  &
Paulus,  2008;  Takahashi,  2009)  are  unified  in  Hick’s  law (Hick,  1952;  Hyman,  1953;  Beh,
Roberts  &  Prichard-Levy,  1994)  Fitt’s  law  (Fitts,  1954;  Fitts  &  Peterson,  1964)  and  their
generalizations  (Krinchik,  1969;  Beggs et  al.,  1972;  Kirkby,  1974; Gignac & Vernon,  2004;
Seow,  2005).  The  model  of  brain  based  on  computer  has  been  suggested  yet  by  John  von
Neumann (1958). There exist even computer models of schizophrenic patients (Hoffman et al.,
2011). Turing machines (i.e. usual computers), which number is bigger than modeled mental,
functions can represent a normal brain in the Nash equilibrium vs only a single one, or which
number is less than the number of modeled mental functions, in Neumann’s approach.
The difference between Nash’s approach and Neumann’s might be visualized even on a single
bit, which is the elementary unit of information, after one adds the concept or even quantity about
the relation or “game” between the two alternatives of a bit. Then each of the two alternatives
“searches” for that strategy, which would increase the probability to be chosen. Then the result
would hesitate arbitrarily about the equal probability (i.e. 50% for each alternative) in Neumann’s
approach. One can say that both alternatives share a single dimension. On the contrary, the result
would be just the equal probability (i.e. the standard definition of a bit) in Nash’s approach, and
as if the two alternatives are separated in dimensions therefore implying their unity as the whole
of a bit.
In  fact,  the concept  of information  interpreted  as  the measure  of  wholeness  or  completeness
corresponds to the latter. The former does not need an absolutely different of wholeness: that of a
non-cooperative and thus competitive game, in which both alternatives (“players”) are involved
one-time or randomly and the same refers to their “wholeness” existing only during the time of
the game.
On the contrary, the healthy brain, mind, and consciousness should have stable wholeness, and
the Nash model would be more relevant. The relevance of the other model, that of Neumann
would witness to disintegration as schizophrenia would be defined in general. 
IV CONCLUSIONS
The  Nash  equilibrium  corresponds  to  wholeness,  stable  emergent  properties  as  well  as  to
representing actual infinity on a material, limited and finite organ as a human brain. Though the
concept was introduced by Nash in relation to game theory therefore presupposing the players as
human  beings  able  to  choose  consciously  their  strategies  in  competition,  it  can  be  easily
generalized to any theory allowing for thermodynamic approach. The main requirement is for the
investigated ensemble to be consider as a system rather than as occasional collection existing
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only for  the game and thus  constituted  ad hock.  The  brain,  mind,  and consciousness  satisfy
obviously that  condition  and consequently  the  application  of  the  ‘Nash equilibrium’  to  both
“normal” and schizophrenic brain. Furthermore, the trends to disintegration of the latter might be
represented  as  decreasing  relevance  as  to  Nash’s  approach  to  equilibrium on  behalf  that  of
Neumann. Thus the thesis of Donald Capps that the Nash equilibrium describes the “normal”
brain while that of Neumann, the schizophrenic brain can be supported by a series of arguments.
The concept of information even the level of its unit, a single bit, unifies both approaches. A bit
“in  tension”  might  be  introduced  to  demonstrated  a  dynamic  and  unstable  equilibrium
corresponding to Neumann’s approach. Then the standard definition of a bit supposing a gap and
thus stability between the two alternatives refers to that of Nash.     
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